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CHAPTER ONE
Introduction
Underpinning an}' regulatory regime is a dichotomy between achieving certaint\' of
outcome and achieving a perceived fairness. While such a discussion may seem out of
place in the context of a regulatory regime dealing with offshore offerings, it nonetheless
serves to emphasize some of the considerations encountered in the following examination
of Regulation S'.
Part Two of this thesis outlines the development of the disclosure regime that is
evidenced in the United States Federal Securities Regulations and then goes on to
examine how this regime, first established in the 1930s, dealt with the advent of
globalization. Part Three then looks at Regulation S. introduced in 1990. An overview of
the Regulation is provided, followed by a detailed examination of the various provisions
of the Regulation. The thesis then moves on to Part Four which sets out some of the more
common abuses that began to occur shortly after the introduction of Regulation S. and
also notes some of the marketplace concerns regarding the operation of the Regulation.
Part Five details the events, criticisms and SEC releases that led up to the amendment of
Regulation S in 1998, before Part Six deals with the actual amendments themselves in
some detail. As it has only been a relatively short time since the adoption of the
' Regulation S - Rules Governing Offers and Sales Made Outside the United States Without Registration
Under the Securities Act of 1933, 17 C.F.R. 230.901 - 230.904 (1990) [hereinafter Original Regulation S]
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amendments, Part Seven assesses the probable impacts which the amendments may
have on both the abuses and the marketplace concerns. Following on from this. Part Eight
provides recommendations should the abuses and concerns continue after the
amendments. Part Nine calls into question the desirability of applying American
securities laws extraterritorially and discusses various approaches to the international
regulation of securities before the brief conclusion in Part Ten.
CHAPTER TWO
The Need For Disclosure
Securities by their very nature are intangible and do not possess any extrinsic value.
Instead, their value comes from the rights which they bestow on their holder, entitling the
owner to vote and also to make claims upon both the assets and income of the issuer.
Therefore, a prospective purchaser of securities presumably needs as much information
as possible relating to the issuer so as to be better able to make an informed investment
decision.
In the United States, the collapse of the securities market in 1 929 provided the
impetus for the creation of a mandatory federal disclosure system. The Securities Act
,
introduced in 1933, is concerned with public offerings and the sale of securities via the
means of interstate commerce.
The underlying philosophy behind the Act was that of disclosure, as it was
assumed that disclosure would prevent the flotation of fraudulent securities as had been
seen in America between 1919 and 1929. During this period many investors saw their life
savings evaporate in securities that were often worthless. The 1933 Act prohibited both
the offering and sale of a security that had not been registered with the Federal Trade
Commission (later, the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC)) and, further, the Act
^ 15U.S.C. s77a-77z-3(1994)
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required that a prospectus be available to all potential investors to whom the offer was
made. In short the prospectus is an attempt to provide issuers with all the necessary
information so as to make an "informed" investment decision.
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 , by comparison, is more concerned with
the protection of secondary market trading but it too also contains mandatory disclosure
requirements.
However the United States' mandatory disclosure regime has not been without
criticism. Many commentators'* have suggested instead that there are sufficient market
motivations for managers to disclose information and thus that there is no need for
federal intervention in securities markets.
Issuers, however, have often sought to avoid the registration provisions of the
1933 Act. One way of doing so has been to seek refuge in one of the so called '"safe
harbors", which, if satisfied, have the effect of not requiring the issue to be approved by
the SEC before being offered and sold. One such safe harbor is Regulation S.''
^ 15U.S.C. s78a-78gg(1994)
* JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION 43 (3d ed. 1997) where it is noted that " the
mandatory disclosure requirements of the '33 and '34 Acts have not escaped the criticism of those who
prefer Adam Smith's invisible hand to the heavy regulatory hand of the federal securities laws".
See also Homer Kripke, The Myth ofthe Informed Layman. 28 BUS. LAW. 631 (1973) and A.A. Sommer.
JR. A Program by the ABA Committee on Federal Regulation ofSecurities, 36 BUS. LAW. 1 19 (1980)
reprinted m LARRY D. SODERQUIST & THERESA A. GADALDON. SECURITIES REGULATION
1 13-120 (4"''ed. 1999) where comments are made by Sommer and Kripke that disclosure does not need to
be addressed by a federal body, but instead that there are more sufficient market incentives for disclosure to
take place.
* Original Regulation S, supra note 1
.
Globalization
The 1980s and 1990s have witnessed the advent of a truly global marketplace.
"Through decreased communication costs and improved international financial
connections, investors and issuers are able to shift capital quickly fi"om one country to
another" . Essentially, Regulation S came about because of ever increasing globalization
as the increasing volume of international transactions placed strains on the previous
system of extraterritoriality.
The move to a global capital market raises many challenges and potential
problems. It has been suggested by commentators that;
The traditional goal of securities regulation, investor protection,
may have to be tempered in a "global market" by (1) the desire of U.S.
investors to invest and trade in foreign securities, (2) the reality that they
may do so outside the United States, and (3) the importance to the United
States of maintaining the world's leading domestic capital market, which
requires openess to foreign issuers [and foreign investors]."
The introduction of Regulation S is an example of this, investor protection
through disclosure takes a backseat to the goals of reducing the cost of raising capital
offshore and enhancing the attractiveness of the U.S. securities market to overseas
investors.
* Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the International Reach of
Securities Regulation. 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 903, 905-906 (1998)
^ HAL S. SCOTT & PHILIP A. WELLONS, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE; TRANSACTIONS,
POLICY, AND REGULATION 32 (4th ed 1997)
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An example of globalization in the United States was the increase in purchases
and sales by US investors of foreign equities from an estimated $17.9 billion in 1980 to
$741.6 billion in 1995.^
Even the SEC acknowledged the trend when it talked of ''the development of
active international trading markets and the significant increase in offshore offerings of
securities, as well as the significant participation by U.S investors in foreign markets."'
So it is obvious that the rapid expansion of the global marketplace changed the U.S.
capital markets dramatically. Foreign issuers have sought to offer their securities to U.S.
investors. U.S. investors have looked to invest in offshore offerings and U.S. issuers have
sought to offer their securities to overseas investors, often for the purposes of raising
capital.
In this thesis the regulatory problems posed by offerings which occur outside of the
United States are examined.'"
United States Federal Securities Regime
The two canons of securities regulation in the United States are full and fair disclosure"
and the concept of registration. Relying on the theory of disclosure "" and the underlying
" RICHARD W. JENNINGS ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS I6I4
(8th ed. 1998), quoting Mann & Sirigiano, International Mergers and Acquisitions: The Experience ofthe
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, (Working Paper, May 1, 1991)
' Offshore Offers and Sales, Securities Act Release No. 33-6863, 17 C.F.R. Parts 200 and 230. 55 PR
1 8306, at 1 83 1 4, May 2 1 990. [hereinafter Adopting Release]
'"
i.e. Offshore Offerings
" See discussion infra Part II.
A
''Id
7assumption that an investor can make up his own mind if he has all the material facts,
the U.S. securities system does not address the fairness of a transaction.
Section 5 of the Securities Act'^ forms the cornerstone of the Act. In general
terms section 5 prohibits the offering and sale of securities until a registration statement
regarding the security has been approved by the SEC.''^
Generally, a registration statement relating to the public offering of securities
must be filed with the SEC before the issuer (or persons in control relationships with the
issuer) can offer the shares to the U.S. public. In the registration statement information
is provided about the issuer, the security itself and the use to which the proceeds from
the offering will be put. amongst other details. Thus, until the offeror of the securities
has satisfied the SEC no sale of the securities can take place. As a result the United
States is widely regarded as having a particularly onerous registration process with the
cost of complying with the Securities Act adding significantly to the cost of the issue.
Section 5 of the Securities Act 1933 provides for prohibitions relating to
"Interstate Commerce". It states that unless a security has a registration statement it is
unlawful for any person to use Interstate Commerce to sell the security. Interstate
Commerce is defined in section 2(7) of the same Act as meaning:
[T]rade or commerce in securities or any transportation or communication
relating thereto among the several States or between the District of
Columbia or any Territory of the United States and any State or other
Territory, or between any foreign country and any State, Territory, or the
District of Columbia, or within the District of Columbia.'"
'^ 15 U.S.C 77(e) (1994)
''' 15 U.S.C 77 c-e (1994) Section 5 states that any offer or sale of securities using interstate commerce
must be registered unless some form of exemption can be granted.
"^ 15 U.S.C. 77b(3)( 1994)
Taken literally, it would not be difficult to believe that any offering whatsoever,
even if undertaken offshore, would come within section 5 if at some stage the US mail
system or telephone system'^ were used in the process of selling the securities abroad.
Thus, for example, if foreign issuer made telephone calls to the United States in the
course of selling securities then that would seemingly also come within section 5 by
virtue of the broad definition of interstate commerce.
However, such a literal interpretation (potentially giving section 5 a worldwide
reach) would be unworkable, to say the least, as it would imply that a public offer or sale
of securities anywhere in the world that involved the use of US interstate commerce must
be registered with the SEC. Not only would this strike fear into the hearts of foreign
issuers, it would also cause problems with foreign regulatory regimes as well as creating
enforcement problems. Yet given that the Securities Act was enacted in an era largely
before the advent of international offerings, it is not then surprising to find such an extra-
territorial reach contained within the legislation.
Securities Act Release 4708*^ was the SEC's first attempt at clarifying to what
extent the legislation was extraterritorial. In this short interpretative release the
Commission set out the view that the registration requirements of the 1933 Act were
largely for the benefit of American investors.
Issued in 1964, during the development of the Eurobond market. Release 4708
stated that if the "offering is made under circumstances reasonably designed to preclude
'* Or any other means of modem communication such as the Internet, e-mail and faxes.
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distribution or redistribution of the securities within, or to nationals of, the United
States", then registration would not be required under section 5. Therefore, in Release
4708, the SEC stated that it would not bring an action for the failure of U.S. corporations
to register securities distributed offshore to foreign nationals, even if the means of
interstate commerce were involved.
However, in spite of this, the position adopted by the SEC was still not entirely
clear as the SEC did not provide any legal or economical reasoning to explain its position
other than that the registration requirements were created to protect American investors.
1 o
This ensuing uncertainty resulted in a number of '"no action letters" where the SEC
interpreted and re-interpreted Release 4708* but failed to shape the policy. "Most
companies were compelled to seek an individualized determination by the Commission's
staff that their particular offerings would not be deemed to occur in the United
States". The position was not clarified until Regulation S was adopted in 1 990^
'^ Registration of Foreign Offerings by Domestic Issuers, Securities Act Release No. 33-4708, July 9 1964,
WL 3661 (SEC) [29 FR 9828]. [hereinafter Release 4708]
'* A "no action letter" is a guarantee from the SEC that it will not bring action against the issuer for being
in breach of section 5. Such a letter is a costly exercise to undertake and also does not provide a clear
precedent for other issuers to rely on.
'*' JENNINGS, supra note 8, at 577.
Kellye Y. Testy, Comity and Cooperation: Securities Regulation in a Global Marketplace, 45 ALA. L.
REV. 927(1994).
CHAPTER THREE
Brief Overview of Regulation S
With the release of Regulation S in 1990 the SEC intended to help large American
corporations in selling their securities to foreign investors, with the foreign investors
anticipated to hold such securities for a considerable period of time.""" By exempting
such issuers from registering under the Securities Act, the SEC set up a territorial
regime, as opposed to the extraterritorial approach that was implicit under section 5.
Regulation S provides guidance on which securities transactions conducted outside the
United States may come under the reach of section 5.
In limiting the span of section 5, the SEC stated that "principles of comity and
the reasonable expectations of participants in the global markets justified reliance on
laws applicable in jurisdictions outside the United States to define requirements for
transactions effected offshore.
"^"^
" L Cohen, Rules Permitting Offshore Stock Sales Yields Deals That Spark SEC Concerns, WALL ST. J,
Apr 26 1994 at CL where Sara Hanks, a New York attorney who helped write Regulation S, commented
"the rule was intended to help big. healthy companies sell bonds and stock to long term European
investors".
" The principle of comity emphasizes restraint and tolerance by nations in international affairs.
^* Adopting Release, supra note 9, at 1 83 14
Made up of Rules 901-904, Regulation S provided ''safe harbors"'^"'' for both
foreign distributions and resales of unregistered securities of U.S. and foreign issuers.
The underlying policy rationale for the introduction of Regulation S was to
reduce the cost of raising capital offshore by giving overseas markets greater
accessibility to domestic issuers,"^ especially in the light of the globalization trend.
Essentially, it opened the door for domestic issuers to raise capital in the global market
as opposed to limiting them to the internal market. Further, it increased the
competitiveness ofUS issuers in the eyes of foreign investors.
Another reason for the introduction of Regulation S was to provide greater
certainty for issuers - as under Release 4708 and the no action letters that followed, the
exact position of the SEC was not evident.
But even though Regulation S was an attempt to tidy up the regulation of
offshore capital, after its introduction it became evident that there were unintended
loopholes in the regulation. These loopholes were essentially contrary to the stated
intention of the SEC when it introduced Regulation S. As a result of the exploitation of
these loopholes. Regulation S was not seen as an effective way of raising offshore
capital. Eventually, as a result of the abuses, the SEC amended the regulation in 1998.
The amendments took place despite Preliminary Note 2 to Regulation S stating that the
regulation is not available for "any transaction or series of transactions that, although in
11
^* i.e. an exemption from the 1933 Securities Act registration requirements
^^ Cohen, supra note 23.
" Offshore Offers and Sale, Securities Act Release No. 33-7505, 17 C.F.R. Parts 230 and 249, 63 FR 9632,
ss 230.901 - 230.905, February 25 1998. [hereinafter Amending Release]. The amended Regulation S
modified the classification of securities under the safe harbor provisions and changed some compliance
requirements.
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technical compliance with the rules, is part of a plan or scheme to evade the
registration provisions of the Act" . So it is arguable that this provision provides the
SEC with sufficient powers to intervene in situations where they see Regulation S being
used in any unintended matter, irrespective of whether the safe harbors have been
satisfied.
What follows in this paper is an examination of the existing Regulation S together
with the abuses of it. Following that, the changes will be examined in light of the abuses
to see if they will actually address the apparent problems.
Regulation S Details, 1990 - 1998
Fundamentally, Regulation S is made up of a general statement provided in Rule 901'
,
definitions in Rule 902, and two non exclusive "safe harbors" in Rules 903 and 904.^°
Rule 90 1 provides that offers and sales of securities which do not take place in
"2 1 T-)
the U.S. are not subjected to the registration requirements of the Securities Act. " Rule
903. known as the "issuer safe harbor", creates a safe harbor for distributors (i.e.
participants in a distribution such as issuers, underwriters and the like). Essentially, it
classifies issuers into one of the three categories on the basis of the relative likelihood
that the securities of that issuer will enter the US markets to trade. Meanwhile Rule 904,
known as the "resale safe harbor", creates a safe harbor for resales by others. This
^*
Id. at Preliminary Note 2
" Original Regulation S. supra note 1 . Note that "Rule 901" refers to s230.901
.
^"
Id. "Rule 903" refers to s230.903, and "Rule 904" refers to s230.904.
^'
Id. with "United States" being defined in s230.902(p)
^^ Id at S230.903
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includes investors who procure securities through a private placement in the US or in a
transaction that is exempt from registration under Rule 144A^^. Thus. Rule 904
concerns itself with whether the purchase of an unregistered security abroad has in fact
been undervvxitten and then resold to an American.
A. The General Statement the Offers and Sales ofSecurities outside the US are not
subject to the Registration Requirements ofSection 5, as outlined under Rule 901,
Original Regulation S.
Rule 901 contains the general statement which provides that registration requirements
under section 5 do not apply to offers or sales of securities outside the U.S. It states
that:
For the purposes only of Section 5 of the Act, the terms ''offer", "offer to
sell", "sell", "sale", and "offer to buy" shall be deemed to include offers and
sales that occur within the United States and shall be deemed not to include
offers and sales that occur outside the United States."''^
The determination of whether an offer and sale is made outside the United States is
made on an ad hoc basis. If the offer and sale satisfy the conditions of either of the safe-
harbor provisions in Rules 903 or 904, such a transaction will be deemed to have
occurred outside the United States and will therefore not be subject to the registration
requirements of section 5.
" 17C.F.R, 230.1 44A( 1997). Rule 144A was adopted by the SEC on April 19 1990. It establishes an
exemption from the registration requirements of the Securities Act for qualifying resales to 'qualified
institutional buyers' of securities that were not fungible (i.e not of the same class) at the time of issuance
with a class of securities publicly traded in the United States.
^^ 17 C.F.R. Section 230.901 (1996)
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B. Two General Conditions required under the Issuer and Resale Safe Harbors
All offers and sales, whether made in reliance on the issuer or the resale safe-harbor,
must satisfy two general conditions in order to be considered outside the United States.
In addition, the issuer must satisfv' specific conditions that are set out in each safe-
harbor provision.
First, any offer or sale of securities must be made in an "offshore transaction".
Rule 902 (h) provides that an offer or sale is made in an offshore transaction if the offer
is not made to a person in the United States^"^ and if either of two additional
requirements are satisfied.
The first of the alternative requirements is that the buyer is outside the United
States, or that the seller reasonably believes that the buyer is outside of the United
States, at the time the buy order is originated.^^ The second alternative means of
satisfying the offshore transaction requirement is to execute the transaction on a
designated offshore securities market . However, if the seller or its agent knows that
the transaction has been prearranged with a buyer in the United States, the second
TO
alternative will not be satisfied .
^' But s 230.902(h)(B)(2) states that "offers and sales of securities specifically targeted at identifiable
groups of U.S. citizens abroad, such as members of the U.S. armed forces serving overseas, shall not be
deemed to be made in "offshore transactions".
^'' 17C.F.Rs230.902(h)(l)(ii)(A)(1996)
^' These non U.S. securities exchanges and markets are listed in 17 C.F.R. s 230.902 (1996)
^* 17 C.F.R s230.902(h)(l)(ii)(B) (1996)
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The second general condition that must be satisfied in order for an offer and
sale to be considered outside the United States is that there be no direct selling efforts
in the United States.
Therefore, if a transaction satisfies the two general conditions (namely that it
takes place offshore and that there is no directed selling in the United States), then it
may well qualify for an exemption from registration under one of the following safe
harbors.
C. Issuer Safe Harbor
Concerning itself with the likelihood that the issuer's securities will enter the US
market'*". Rule 903 is applicable to offers and sales by issuers, distributors and their
affiliates or any persons acting on their behalf The safe harbor is available to both U.S.
and foreign issuers offering securities outside the United States.
The issuer safe harbor distinguishes among three categories of securities
offerings "based upon factors such as the nationality and reporting status of the issuer
and the degree of U.S. market interest in the issuer's securities" . The first category
applies to non U.S. issuers, including the securities of foreign issuers who have no
substantial market interest in their securities in the US. " The second category is
applicable to securities of foreign reporting issuers who have a substantial market
^' Defined in s 230.902(c ) as "any activity undertaken for the purpose of ... conditioning the market in the
United States for any of the securities being offered"
*** The greater the likelihood that the securities will flow back into the United States, the more difficult the
procedural requirements necessary to avoid registration are.
'" Adopting Release, supra note 9, at 18307
'^ 17 C.F.R. s 230.903(c )(1)(1996)
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interest in their securities in the U.S., and also to certain securities issued by
nonreporting foreign issuers. "^^ Finally, category three applies to all issuers not under
category one or two. This third category includes domestic nonreporting issuers and
foreign nonreporting issuers who have a substantial market interest within the US for
their securities. ^^ The more likely that the securities are going to enter the U.S. markets,
the more onerous the category requirements are.
/. Category One
This issuer category, which applies to securities both offered and sold by foreign
issuers'*'^ having ''no substantial US market interest"'*^ in their securities and also to
securities offered and sold in "overseas directed offerings""*''. It also applies to securities
backed by "the full faith and credit of a foreign government" and securities issued
pursuant to employee benefit plans administered offshore.'*
Both offers and sales under this category do not require any further conditions to
be satisfied other than the two general conditions discussed above, (namely that it be an
offshore transaction and that there are no directed selling efforts in the US).
This category is the least onerous issuer safe harbor category because the SEC
has taken the view that such offers are the least likely to be of risk to domestic US
investors (that is, category one securities are unlikely to flow back to the United States).
'^ Id at s 230.903(c) (2)
'' Id at s 230.903 (c) (3)
^^ Id at s 230.902(0(1)
"• Id at s230.902(n)
*^
Id. at s230.903(c)(l (ii), with an "overseas directed offering" being defined at s230.902(j)
**
Id. at s 230.903 (c )(1 (iii), with "foreign government" defined at s 230.902 (e)
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//. Category Two
The second safe harbor for issuers under the original Regulation S is applicable to
securities of domestic reporting issuers, foreign reporting issuers who had a substantial
market interest in the U.S. for their securities, non-reporting foreign issuers (with
respect to their debt securities) and non-participating preferred stock and asset backed
securities of the non-reporting foreign issuers.^^ This safe harbor only applies to equity
securities of domestic, reporting issuers, and to foreign issuers with a "substantial
market interesf in the U.S. for their securities.^'
Securities falling within category two are subject to the two general conditions "
and also several selling restrictions'^. Broadly speaking, these regulations can be
divided into restrictions regarding transactions and restrictions relating to offerings.
Transactional restrictions necessitate that securities sold before the end of a 40
day restricted period are not offered or sold for the benefit of a US person" . Thus
distributors who sell securities to securities professionals require notice from the
purchaser that they too are subject to the same requirements as the distributor.
A "U.S. person" is defined as "any natural person resident in the United
States". ^^ Therefore, it follows that any foreign or domestic national resident in the
United States is classified as a U.S. person under Regulation S.
*"
Id. at s 230.903 (c)(l)(iv)
'"
Id. at s 230.903 (c )(2)
yd
*^ That it be an offshore transaction and that there be no directed selling efforts in the U.S.
" 17 C.F.R. s 230.903(c )(2)(ii)-(iv) (1996)
^* Id at s 230.903(c )(2)(iii), with "restricted period" being defined in s230.902(m)
"M ats230.903(o)(l)(i)
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For corporations, the place of incorporation usually is controlling."^ But, the
SEC has observed that if a corporation is organized or incorporated in a foreign
jurisdiction by a US person, with the purposes of investing in securities not registered
with the SEC, then such a corporation will come within the definition of a US person
for the purposes of Regulation S.^^
Offering restrictions, of which there are two. must also be met under this second
CO
category. They must be adopted by the entire offering.' First, every distributor is
required to agree in writing that all offers and sales made before the ending of the
restricted period will be carried out either in line with the safe harbor provisions of
Regulation S. or in line with registration or an exemption. Secondly, all materials and
documents used in connection with the offer and sale of the securities during the
restricted period must contain a statement stating that the securities have not been
registered and further that they may not be offered or sold in the U.S. to a U.S. person
unless they are registered or there has been an exemption.''
///. Category Three
The third issuer safe harbor is essentially a residual provision for issuers that do not fall
within the first two categories. Therefore, this category includes issuers of domestic
^'/c/. ats230.902(o)(l)(ii)(v)
" Id at s 230.902(o)(viii)(A)-(B)
'"
Id. at s 230.903(c )(3)(i), with "offering restrictions" being defined in s230.902(h)
'' Id at s 230.902(h)(2)
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nonreporting equity securities and foreign nonreporting issuers with a substantial
market interest in the US for their securities. ^^
Because category three is an attempt to protect against unregistered distributions
when there is a possibilit>' that the securities may flow back into the U.S. and where
there is little information about the issuer, then the requirements having to be satisfied
under category three are stricter then the other two categories.
As well as satisfying the two general conditions (namely of an offshore
transaction and no directed selling efforts in the U.S.), securities coming within the third
category are also required to satisfy the two offering restrictions, similar to category
two, however the third category requires that the securities be subjected to a one year
restricted period.
'
Further, the transactional requirements under category three are stricter than
those under the second category. Purchasers are required to certify that they are not U.S.
persons and further that they are not acquiring the securities for the benefit of a U.S.
person. ^^ Purchasers are also required to agree to resell the securities only in line with
the rules controlling Regulation S or pursuant to registration, or any other exemption. ^^
Category three transactional restrictions also require that issuers state, by means of
a legend, that the transfer of such securities is prohibited unless the transfer is in
accordance with Regulation S.^"^ Aligned to this is the requirement that the issuer must
^^
Id. at s 230.903(c)(3)
" Id. at ss 230.902(h), 230.903(c) (3)(i)-(iii)(A)
" Id at s 230.903(c )(3)(iii)(B)(l)
" Id at s 230.903(c )(3)(iii)(B)(2)
64
Id at s 230.903(c )(3)(iii)(B)(3)
20
refuse to register any transfer of category three securities made outside Regulation S
requirements.^"^ Furthermore, those distributors who are selHng either equity or debt
securities before the expiration date of the restricted period are also required to notify
purchasers of their obligation to be subjected to the same restrictions on offers and sales
that apply to the distributor^^.
D. Resale Safe Harbor
Irrespective of whether a sale of an unregistered security is made by an issuer or a
subsequent purchaser, an exemption is required from the registration requirements.^^ Rule
904 of Regulation S provides such a method for the resale of unregistered securities by
providing a safe harbor for the offshore resale of unregistered securities by persons other
than the issuer, distributor or their agents.
In order to be eligible for Rule 904, two general conditions must be satisfied -
namely that the transaction takes place offshore and further that there be no directed
selling efforts within the U.S. If these are satisfied, then the resale is taken as having
occurred outside the U.S. for the purposes of the general statement and also the
69
registration requirements.
'•^
Id. at s 230.903(c )(3)(iii)(B)(4)
**
Id. at s 230.903(c )(3)(iv), the two restrictions are that it be an offshore transaction and that there are no
directed selling efforts in the U.S.
^''
Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. s 5 (1994)
''' 17 C.F.R.s 230.904 (1996)
"Id
CHAPTER FOUR
Abuses Which Occurred After the Introduction of Regulation S
The intended users of Regulation S were sound domestic corporations seeking the
placement of securities with long term offshore investors in order to compete in the
global market place/°
But after one year the SEC filed its first enforcement action, involving violations
7 1
of Regulation S. As increasing enforcement actions were brought, it became readily
apparent that the loopholes in Regulation S had not only been widely discovered, but
further that they exposed Regulation S to abuse, contrary to its stated intention as
outlined above. Further, concerns arose on Wall Street.^" There have been a number of
differing abuses of Regulation S. Detailed below are examples of different such abuses.
A. Illegal Resales within the Restricted Period.
Any resale of Regulation S securities back into the US before the end of a restricted
period is a violation of Regulation S unless another exemption can be relied upon or
registration has taken place.
""*
Release 4708, supra note 17
'' SEC V. Westdon Holding & Inv., Inc., Securities Act Litigation Release No. 13,085
^^
J Scholl, Easy Money. BARRON'S. Apr. 29, 1996
" Cohen, supra note 23, at ss 230.903(c )(2)(iii) and 230.903(c )(3)(iii)(A)
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Liability can arise when the restricted period is not adhered to. In one case^"^ a
broker was fined US$150,000 by the regulatory arm of the National Association of
Securities Dealers (NASD) because one of the brokerage's customers had purchased
Regulation S securities and then sold them back in the US. via the broker's accounts,
before the end of the restricted period for the securities. The broker in this case was fined
for failing to make the necessary "affirmative determiriation" - such as marking on the
order form where the shares were located and whether the shares were in a deliverable
form - in determining whether the securities would be within the restricted periods,
before carrying out the sales.
'
B. Creation and Use ofFake Offshore "Parking" Entities as a Meansfor Selling
Unregistered Securities in the US.
In another abuse of Regulation S. a phoney offshore "parking" entity has often been
created as a means for an issuer or distributor to directly profit from the sale of the
unregistered securities back into the US.
Under such a scheme, Regulation S is stated as the basis for selling securities to
offshore shell companies formed, in many cases, by the issuer or distributor.^^ The
offshore shells then hold the securities for the restricted period before selling them into
'*
In re Alex Brown & Sons, Inc., No.CMS 960084 AWC (NASD)
" D. Lohse, NASD Regulators Fine Alex Brown, WALL ST.J., Oct. 1, 1996, at C13
''^
Problematic Practices Under Regulation S, Securities Act Release No. 33-7190, 17 C.F.R. Part 231. 60
FR 35663, 35664 June 27 1995 [hereinafter Problematic Practices Release]
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the US. The proceeds of the sale then make their way, either in a direct or indirect
manner, to the issuer or distributor.
The SEC, however, has taken the view that such transactions do not come within
Regulation S because they are "nothing more than sham offshore transactions structured
no
to evade the Securities Act registration requirements'". In the case SEC v Softpoint
Inc. ^ Softpoint was charged by the SEC with a variety of violations, including
participating in a number of transactions that sold Regulation S securities that were not
registered in the US, and then ''dressed up" the proceeds as earnings from corporate sales.
In order for this to take place, the SEC alleged that Softpoint issued Regulation S
securities to offshore distributors who in fact had been either formed or controlled by
Softpoint. By doing so, Softpoint was able to indirectly control the sale of the securities
by the offshore distributors back into the US. The earnings received were fictitiously
claimed as being from product sales.
In the Softpoint case the court noted that Regulation S only provided a safe harbor
for ""bona fide" overseas transactions, in keeping with the intention expressed in
Preliminary Note 2. Regulation S was not a mechanism for foreign securities
distributions to evade the registration requirements of Regulation S. Therefore, it was
held that Softpoint did not undertake bona fide offshore transactions, and therefore could
not rely on the safe harbor provisions of Regulation S.
''Id.
^* SEC V Softpoint Inc, SEC Litigation Release No. 14480, 59 SEC Docket 426 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.27 1995)
''Id.
''Id
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In another case. United States v Sung , an offshore shell was created in order
to profit from the sale of Regulation S securities. This case was notable as it was the first
time a criminal conviction was imposed for fraud involving Regulation S. Both the
former chairman and his associate were convicted.
For a three month period in 1992, the chairman of Sung saw that over 1 .4 million
shares of unregistered common stock were issued, pursuant to Regulation S. in the name
of a 95 year old woman, presumably at a discount to their trading price. This account was
controlled by the associate. The chairman also saw that a further 1 .2 million shares were
issued to seven shell entities he controlled in the Bahamas. After doing so. the chairman
then proceeded to stimulate the price upwards by issuing deceiving financial statements
0">
and untrue press statements. ' When the share price was deemed high enough by the
chairman and his associates, they then proceeded to sell the stock in the U.S. market for
around $5.5 million.
C. The Use ofPromissory Notes in Purchasing Regulation S Securities when the
Expectation ofRepayment Stemsfrom the Regulation S Securities back into the
U.S. Market
Yet another situation where Regulation S abuses have occurred involves the use of
Promissory Notes. In this situation, an offshore investor would purchase discounted
Regulation S shares after signing a promissory note that was interest free and short term
SEC Litigation Release No. 1 490 1 . 6 1 SEC Docket 2275 (M.D.FIa May 6 1 996)
"^ Id at 2275
''Id
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in nature. After the expiration of the restricted period (which in most cases was 40
days), the offshore investor would sell the shares into the U.S. market. With the money
received from the sale, the promissory note could be paid off, and then any amount left
over (which there was in most cases because the shares were usually discounted from the
prevailing market price when originally sold offshore) would be profited by the offshore
investor. In essence, this meant not only that the foreign investors received the shares for
nothing, but that they were making a profit out of the transaction as well.
In the case In the Matter ofCandie 's. Inc. administrative proceedings were
brought by the SEC against the two issuers involved (a women's footwear company and a
security company), a law firm and also the head of a brokerage. The proceedings were
brought for "alleged violations of the securities laws involving the use of promissory
notes in the purchase of Regulation S securities".^" Here, the issuers sold shares by
seeking the Regulation S exemptions, via both a law firm and a brokerage firm to foreign
investors at a discount. In return, the foreign companies granted short term, unsecured
promissory notes. At the conclusion of the appropriate restricted period, the stock was
sold by the foreign companies back into the US via the brokerage firm, and the
promissory notes were paid off by a part of the proceeds of the sale.^^
Here, the SEC found the offerings were in fact a scheme designed with the
intention of avoiding registration, and thus found them not to be offers and sales of
"^ Securities Act Release No. 7263. 61 SEC Docket 758 (Feb.21 1996)
"*
Id. at 759
*''
Id. at 761
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securities protected by Regulation S. The foreign participants were found to have been
engaged essentially to provide protection for the sale of unregistered securities in the US.
This case was significant because it marked one of the earliest cases where, under
Regulation S, the SEC found that the regulation was violated, in spite of there being no
fraud or violation of the regulation itself Instead, the SEC viewed the transactions as
being schemes "to evade the registration requirements of the federal securities laws'". ^^
This interpretation was reached by an examination of Preliminary Note 2 of Regulation S.
D. The Use ofthe Resale Safe Harbor to "Wash Off' Restrictionsfrom Otherwise
Restricted Securities
Another example of how investors use the Resale Safe Harbor to "wash off" the
restrictions placed on Regulation S securities under the restricted period is where
investors take securities which are restricted and cannot be sold publicly within the U.S.
and then, relying on the provisions relating to the resale safe harbor, sell the securities
offshore.
In its "Problematic Practices Release" , the SEC outlined such a practice and
then forbade it on the grounds that the resale safe harbor could not be used in such a way
so as to "wash off any restrictions on resale. In its release, the SEC stated that "if a
person with restricted securities sold the securities in an offshore transaction and replaced
*' Id at 763
** See supra note 77
"''/t^. at 35671
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them with a repurchase of fungible unrestricted securities" , then the securities which
acted as a replacement would in fact be subjected to the same restrictions as those they
replaced.
E. The Use ofHedging as a Means to Lock in Profits Associated with Discounted
Purchases Under Regulation S
Yet another way in which Regulation S was subjected to abuse was via hedging. Also
known as "short-selling"^', hedging occurs where an overseas investor would buy a
certain amount of Regulation S stocks, usually at a significant discount, and then would
instantaneously sell short the same shares for the market price. By doing so. the offshore
investor would "lock in" the difference between the discounted price and the market
price, while at the same time not being subjected to any of the risks involved with waiting
due to the restricted period. At the time when the offshore investor closes out the short
positions (at the conclusion of the restricted period) the Regulation S shares are then sold
back into the US for the market price, with the proceeds of this sale being used to cover
the short positions by purchasing the same number of shares at the market price. Such a
practice is known as a "wash".
"'Id.
'' Selling short occurs when an investor sells a security that he does not own but is committed to repurchase
eventually. Investors first borrow stock from willing broker-dealers then the investors sell the borrowed
stock in the marketplace. Later, investors must replace the borrowed stock either through purchases of the
stock on the open market or, as in the GFL Ultra scenario, through Regulation S stock purchased earlier
once the stock becomes eligible for trades in the United States.
Investors use short sales to capitalize on an expected decline in a security's price.
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In the case In the Matter ofGFL Ultra Funcf' a British Virgin Islands
investment company operated under a strategy of immediately short selling Regulation S
stocks at a discount.^^ The strategy specifically involved the purchase of securities of
U.S. issuers at substantial discounts in offshore transactions pursuant to Regulation S and
hedging some or all of these transactions through short selling in the United States before
or during the 40 day restricted period applicable to the' Regulation S transactions. The
company subsequently unwound these short positions either through covering the short
sales with Regulation S shares themselves, or by selling the Regulation S shares in the
U.S. secondary market following the restricted period and purchasing other shares in the
open market to cover the short positions. The result of such a strategy, according to the
SEC. was that the company had a profit at the end of the trading by virtue of it locking in
its profits when it took its short positions.
This transaction was found to have been a violation of the Securities Act. with
particular reliance placed on section 5. It came within section 5, because, in the view of
the SEC, covering a short position was the same as a '"sale" for the purposes of section
5?^ In reaching this position, the SEC also took account of the numerous exemptions
which GFL Ultra sought to rely on. However, it dismissed all the possible exemptions.
Section 4(1) "^ concerning private placements did not apply because the company was a
"statutory underwriter", as defined under section 2(a)(l 1) of the Securities Act^^. This
'^ Administrative Proceeding Release No. 3-9333, 64 SEC Docket 1958 (June 18, 1997)
''Id.
15 U.S.C. s 77d(l) (1994). This section exempts transactions by any person other than an issuer,
underwriter or dealer from the provisions of section 5.
'' 15 U.S.C s77b(ll) (1994)
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section defines an underwriter as including "any person who has purchased securities
from an issuer with a "view" towards the "distribution" of the securities''^^. Therefore.
GFL Ultra could not use section 4(1) in order to gain any form of exemption.
The GFL Ultra case also reiterated earlier SEC comments in the Problematic
Practices Release that such trading was unacceptable. The SEC observed that "a trading
pattern of short selling in the United States in connection with purchasing a Regulation S
offering, which essentially locks in a profit . . . runs counter to the goals of Regulation
However the GFL Ultra case is also notable for the significant dissent that the
former SEC Commissioner, Steve Wallman made. He was of the opinion that at the time
that the Fund's transactions took place, there was too much confusion as to the
Commission's position on the hedging of securities (such as short term sales) under
Regulation S, especially given the fact that at the time of the issuance of the Problematic
Practices Release, the Fund had already stopped the hedging practices. Therefore, in his
opinion, he felt that such retroactive, "after the fact" enforcement was not appropriate.^*^
However in spite of the GFL Ultra case, the question still remained as to whether
individuals could also be liable for hedging or short selling securities which came under
Regulation S, as the case did not deal directly with this issue.
'^ The term "person" is defined in section 2(a)(2) of the Securities Act as including "a corporation". The
SEC found that the shares here were "distributed" because a substantial number flowed into the U.S trading
markets and came to rest in the hands of the investing public. See n. 12
''*
In the Matter of GFL Ultra Fund Ltd., Administrative Proceeding Release No. 3-9333, 64 SEC Docket
1958 at 1960 (June 18, 1997)
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In summary, while it is not clear whether or not the SEC intended to make hedging
illegal, it is clear that the Commission did not like this use of Regulation S. Thus, this
case serves as a warning to Regulation S offering participants that hedging transactions
have been identified as being inconsistent with the policies underlying the Securities Act
and may in fact represent a basis for enforcement actions.
Marketplace Concerns About Regulation S
It would be incorrect to say that the numerous enforcement actions bought by the SEC
against those who breached Regulation S were the only reason for bringing about a
general dissatisfaction with the Regulation. Over time, there have also been a number of
concerns arising in the market generally about the workings of Regulation S . What
follows below is a discussion of some of these concerns.
A. Discounted Shares Available Solely to Foreign Purchasers
In many cases, shares sold under Regulation S are sold to offshore buyers at a discount to
those available in the market. Unregistered securities falling under Regulation S can be
""* For example see SEC v. Ari Fames et al. Litigation Release No. 1 6877, Jan. 3 1 , 200 1 . The SEC charged
defendants with a fraudulent manipulation scheme. The defendants issued $3.6 million of convertible
Immunogen debentures under Regulation S to five Panamanian companies with a post office box in
Switzerland. However the debentures never left the United States as they were held by an attorney of one of
the defendants in New York. By selling short 1.7 million of the shares, and through other market
manipulative techniques, the defendants drove down Immunogen's stock price. The defendants then
converted the Regulation S debentures into common stock at a discount to the market price (which they had
artificially depressed), and then used the stock to cover their short positions. By doing so they illegally
distributed the securities in the U.S. and produced millions of dollars of illegal profits.
Josh Futterman, Evasion and Flowback in the Regulation S Era: Strengthening U.S. Investor Protection
While Promoting U.S. Corporate Offshore Offerings, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 806 (1995) (Discussing
problems of discounting, lack of disclosure and flowback).
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sold for any price to foreign investors. This discounting usually comes about because
Regulation S shares cannot be issued to U.S. investors.
Discounts are justified by promoters and issuers because of the restricted period in
which the foreign investors have to w^ait with their securities before they can do anything
with them, and the ensuing risk which the foreign investors must bear while waiting. In
other cases, discounting occurs when a company is unable to raise funds without reducing
their share price in order to become attractive to offshore investors. While it is
acknowledged that some discounts may be justified, especially given the risks that
foreign investors have to run' ". many domestic U.S. investors have formed the opinion
that such discounts are not only unfair, but advantageous to foreign investors at their own
expense.
"^^
In some cases. Regulation S shares were sold for up to 50% less than the market
price - meaning that the market price would have to virtually collapse within the 40 day
restricted period before the offshore investor would lose money on the transaction.'^"^
B. Lack ofDisclosure
Up until the latter stages of 1996, the SEC did not require disclosure of Regulation S
offerings. '°"^ This meant that until this time, domestic investors were largely unaware of
'"^ The SEC has recognized that "some discounts may well be warranted in order to compensate for the
length of the restricted period, historic volatility of the stock, financial condition of the issuer, the dilution
represented by the newly issued shares, current market condition, availability of current information as to
the issuer, information the issuer may have had that was disclosed to the purchaser but not otherwise
disclosed to the market, or other factors." Problematic Practices Release, supra 77 at n.l4
'"^ Scholl, supra note 73
•"^ /d
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many Regulation S offerings. The 1996 release required reporting issuers to report
offerings within 15 days of their occurrence. '°^ However even today when non reporting
issuers are involved, it will not be apparent when a Regulation S transaction has taken
place. There will merely be an unexplained increase in the company's shares outstanding.
In many cases, because of the domestic investors" lack of knowledge, they sustain losses
due to an unexpected decline in the share value. The share value declines in these
situations when the foreign investors sell their shares in the US market at the end of the
restricted period, unbeknown to domestic investors, thus increasing the amount of shares
available in the marketplace. Occasionally knowledge leaks out of a Regulation S
transaction having taken place,
'^^
and this too has the effect of reducing the share price in
the market.
C Dilutive Effects as a result ofthe Flow ofRegulation S Securities Back into the US
Market
Tied in closely with a lack of knowledge of a Regulation S offering having taken place is
the dilutive effect associated with the flow of Regulation S shares back into the US
market. The share price decline can best be explained by simple supply and demand
analysis. For if an issuer increases its issued capital by issuing more shares, then this
necessarily implies that the value of each existing share declines. With domestic issuers
being unaware of the Regulation S offering, when the foreign purchaser comes out of the
"*^ See Periodic Reporting of Unregistered Equity Sales, Exchange Act Release No. 37801, 62 SEC
Docket 2762, 2763 (Oct. 1 8, 1 996)
106
Id. at 88,701
restricted period and then chooses to sell the shares on the US market, the increased
supply of shares usually leads to a drop in share price. This all occurs before the domestic
investor has had a chance to find out about it.
'"' Scholl. supra note 73
CHAPTER FIVE
Events Leading up to the Amendment of Regulation S
Given the combination of discounting, the lack of disclosure and the dilutive effects,
coupled with the abuses that took place, it is possible to see how Regulation S could be
used in a manner detrimental to the interests of the investors it was set up to protect while
at the same time creating unintended opportunities for astute offshore investors.
Furthermore, Regulation S helped subvert the general principles underlying the U.S.
securities regime. What follows below is an examination of the events and criticisms that
lead to the recent amendments to Regulation S.
Developing Criticism of the Regulation
1 OS
Starting in 1994 with media coverage and SEC murmurings of displeasure with the
way Regulation S was headed , Edward Markey, Chair of the House Energy and
Commerce Telecommunications and Finance subcommittee wrote to the SEC in April of
that year requesting they report to Congress regarding the repeal or modification of
Regulations.'"^
'"* Scholl. supra note 73. This is one such example of media commentary concerning the operation of
Regulation S.
'"' SEC's Walter Highlights Concern over Application ofRegulation S, 26 SEC. REG & L. REP. (BNA)
366 (Mar. 11,1994).
"" Markey Seeks Report on Regulation S. 26 SEC. REG. & L. REP (BNA) 636 (Apr 29, 1 997)
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In a response to Markey, SEC Chairman, Arthur Levitt did verify that the SEC
was conscious of the abuses." ' and that the SEC's review could see the updating of the
regulation to take account of the abuses or increase its enforcement provisions against
such abuses.
Problematic Practices Release
1 !
"^
In its release referred to as "Problematic Practices under Regulation S" "" the SEC
outlined its assessment of violations of Regulation S. In particular, the release
concentrated on Preliminary Note 2 of the original Regulation S stating that the
regulation was not available '"with respect to any transaction or series of transactions that,
although in technical compliance [with the regulation] was part of a plan or scheme to
evade the registration provisions of the Acf"."^
Thus in the report, the SEC noted that there were cases in which securities were
being placed overseas in order to escape the registration requirements, and commented
that such dealings were contrary to Preliminary Note 2. The report listed the use of bogus
offshore shell companies, the improper use of promissory notes, hedging of Regulation S
securities purchased at a discounted rate and the "washing off of restrictions as
transactions which breached Regulation S."**
'"
Id., referring to Letter from Arthur Lewitt, SEC Chairman, to Edward Markey, Chair of House of
Energy and Commerce Telecommunications and Finance (May 6, 1994).
"^ Problematic Practices Release, supra note 77, at 35,664
"' Original Regulation S, supra note 1, at Preliminary Note 2
"^ Problematic Practices Release, supra note 77, at 35, 664
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In issuing its release, the SEC also sought input on how to deal with such
problems. It sought suggestions relating to a possible extension of the 40 day period to a
one year period, and whether category three restrictions should be placed on category two
securities. Also requiring comment was whether or not there should be some limit
imposed on the amount of discounting available to securities coming under Regulation S.
Finally discussion was encouraged regarding restrictions on hedging and the use of
promissory notes.
Fifteen Day Reporting Requirement for Regulation S Offerings
In response to the lack of disclosure requirements under Regulation S. the SEC in
October 1996 brought into effect amendments to the reporting forms of the Exchange
Act, by requiring domestic, reporting issuers to disclose any offerings made under
Regulation S. The effect of this was that all offerings made by domestic reporting
issuers coming within Regulation S had to be disclosed on a form known as Form 8-K."''
This had to be undertaken within 15 days of the offering having taken place.
Proposed Amendments to Regulation S
After receiving submissions, the SEC published its proposed amendments to Regulation
I I K
S in February of 1997. Here, the Commission advocated extending the restricted period
''^
Id. at 35,665
"* Periodic Reporting of Unregistered Equity Sales, supra note 105. at 2763
'''id. at 2764
"" Offshore Offers and Sales, Securities Act Release No. 33-7392. 17 C.F.R. Parts 228,229,230 and 249,
62 Fed. Reg. 9258, February 28 1997. [hereinafter Proposed Amendments Release].
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for two years for domestic issuers and also for foreign issuers who had a principal
market in the U.S."^ The rationale behind the extended two year period was to adjust the
restricted period to coincide with the restricted period under Rule 144'"°. Also in this
proposed amendments release, the SEC suggested extending the stricter category three
requirements to all equity securities of domestic issuers and foreign issuers with a
principal market for their securities in the U.S.
In order to achieve this, the SEC intended that a new section be added to
Regulation S to reclassify such securities "" to come within Rule 144. ~^ The Commission
also intended to prohibit promissory notes being used as a method of payment for
Regulation S securities, and further, that purchasers of Regulation S securities would
have to agree not to participate in any hedging of such securities.
'"'*
Responses to the new measures proposed were varied.'""^ While the SEC believed
the measure would put a halt to the abuses, others formed the opinion that the measures
had gone too far to the other extreme and would be too restrictive for issuers attempting
to raise capital via Regulation S.'^^
"V^. at 9260
'^'' 17 C.F.R.s 230.144 (1996)
'^' Proposed Amendments Release supra note 118, at 9260-9262
122
i.e. equity securities of domestic issuers and foreign issuers with a principal market for their securities in
the U.S.
'" Proposed Amendments Release, supra note 1 1 8. at 9263
'" Id at 9262-9263. 9265
'^' See as examples the letter from AIMR (Association for Investment Management and Research)
http://w\vw.aimr.org/professionalism/advocacv/97/commltr/offshore/html and J McLaughlins letter
httD://204.192.28.3/rules/Droposed/s7897/mciaughl.htm
*
Id., with particular reference to the McLaughlin letter.
CHAPTER SIX
Amendments to Regulation S
Actual amendments to Regulation S were adopted by the SEC on 10 February 1998. and
came into force on 27 April 1998.'^^ When issuing the amendments, the SEC observed
that they were "'designed to stop the abusive practices in connection with the offerings of
1 98
equity securities purportedly made in reliance on Regulation S". The release also noted
that the area subject to most violation concerned the equity securities of domestic
issuers.'" Therefore, it is not surprising that there have been significant changes to
Regulation S concerning this area.
Domestic reporting equity securities were reclassified under the amendment to
fall under the third issuer safe harbor. ' A new rule which classifies equity securities of
both reporting and nonreporting domestic issuers as restricted securities under Rule
144'"'' was also added.
'"' Amending Release, supra note 28. See also Regulation S - Rules Governing Offers and Sales Made
Outside the United States Without Registration Under the Securities Act of 1933, 17 C.F.R. ss230.901 -
230.905, (1998) [hereinafter Amended Regulation S].
'^* Amending Release, supra note 28, at 9632.
'^''
Id. at 9632 - 9633
"" Amended Regulation S, supra note 124, at s230. 903(b)(3), and Amending Release, supra note 28, at
9634-9633.
"'
Id. at S230.905 and 9636 respectively
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However foreign issuers with a principal market for their securities in the US
did not have any further restriction imposed upon them - the reason being the lack of
132
abuse in this area.
General Statement is Not affected by the Amendments
The general statement, as under Rule 901. did not undergo any amendments, in that it
continued to state that offers and sales of securities that take place outside of the U.S. and
that satisfy Regulation S will continue to be exempted from the registration requirements
of section 5 of the Securities Act.'
Amendments to the Issuer and Resale Safe Harbors
Generally speaking, the amendments changed the classifications of the securities that
came under the different safe harbor categories.
A. Amendments to the Two General Conditions ofan Offshore Transaction and No
Directed Selling Efforts in the United States
The two general conditions remain for both issuer and resale safe harbors.' ^ Definitional
changes are the main differences between the original Regulation S and the amended
version. The category of "designated offshore markets" has been expanded to include
'^^ Amending Release, supra note 28, at 9633 and Proposed Amendments Release, supra note II 8, at 9260
-9263.
'" Amended Regulation S, supra note 127, at s 230.901.
'" Id at ss 230.903 (a)(lH2), 230.904 (a)(l)-(2)
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markets that had been designated after the adoption of the original Regulation S.'^'' The
definitions of "directed selling efforts" have been changed within the Regulation so as to
make them more succinct, although directed selling efforts still embrace any efforts
which prepare the U.S market for the offering and selling of securities through
Regulation S. 136
B. Amendments to the Issuer Safe Harbor
The main change with respect to the issuer safe harbor was to equity securities of
domestic reporting issuers. Such securities were moved into the third issuer safe harbor
while the same type of securities of foreign issuers remained in the second category.
137
There were also some slight definitional changes 138
/. Changes to Category One
The first issuer safe harbor continues to apply to the securities of offshore issuers who do
not have a substantial U.S. market interest for their securities. '^^ to securities sold in
"overseas directed offerings", '''° securities backed by a foreign government'"*' and foreign
"'
Id. at s 230.902(b)
'^'
Id. at s 230.902(c)
"^ Id at s 230.903(b)(2)-(3)
'^* Amending Release, supra note 28, at 9638
'^' Amended Regulation S. supra note 127, at s 230.903(b)(l)(i)
""/c/. ats230.903(b)(l)(ii)
'"M ats230.903(b)(l)(iii)
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employee benefit plans. '''^ All that securities falling into this category have to satisfy
are the two general conditions of Regulation S.
There have been no changes to the definitions of category one securities.
However, equity securities of domestic issuers falling under category one that have been
sold to foreign employees according to employee benefit plans controlled by foreign law
have now been reclassified to be restricted securities and instead fall under Rule 144. As
a result of this, such securities are now under the limitations of a one year restricted
period before being able to be resold into the U.S., as opposed to in the past when they
had no such restrictions other than the general category one requirements imposed on
them.
//. Changes to Category Two
Securities coming within category two have changed significantly from the original
Regulation S. Equity securities of domestic reporting issuers are no longer in this
category - having been moved to category three instead'"^^ , while securities of foreign
reporting issuers having a substantial market interest for their issuings in the U.S., debt
securities of reporting domestic and foreign nonreporting issuers are included in the
amended category two.'"*^
"^/o'. ats230.903(b)(l)(iv)
'"^M at s 230.903(b)(1)
""• Id at s 230.903. Amending Release, supra note 28. at 9634
'*' Amended Regulation S, supra note 127, at s 230.903(b)(2)-(3) and compare with Adopting Release,
supra note 8 at s 230.903(c )(2)
'"^ Amended Regulation S, supra note 127, at s 230.903(b)(2)
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For those securities which are under category two, the two general conditions
must still be satisfied (that there is an offshore transaction and that there are no directed
selling efforts in the U-S.).'"*' Category two securities must also satisfy the transactional
requirements - namely a 40 day restricted period where the securities cannot be sold to or
for the benefit of a U.S. person.'"*^ Distributors selling to securities professionals during
this period still need to provide the purchaser with notice that they too are subject to the
same restrictions as the distributor.
One definitional aspect worth noting is that the term "'restricted period" as it was
referred to in the original Regulation S is now known as the "distribution compliance
period". The actual definition remains as it always was - instead the term used to identify
it has been changed so as to avoid any confusion between the terms "restricted period"
and "restricted securities". The offering restrictions of category two, however, have
remained the same.''*^
Hi. Changes to Category Three
While category three is still pertinent to all equity and debt falling within the earlier
categories, it now also includes the equity securities of domestic reporting issuers.
'"•^
Id. at s 230.903(a)
"* Id at s 230.903(b)(2)(ii)
'''
Id. at ss 230.902(g), 230.903(b)(2)(i). This means that distributors still must agree in writing that both
offers and sales made before the end of the distribution compliance period will fall under Regulation S and
that all offering materials used regarding the sale of Regulation S securities in the distribution compliance
period also have to contain statements to the effect that the securities have not been registered and cannot
be sold in the U.S. or to U.S. persons unless they have been registered first or granted an exemption.
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domestic nonreporting issuers and foreign nonreporting issuers who have a substantial
market interest in the U.S. for their securities.
'^°
Because of the higher probabiUty that category three securities will flow back into
the U.S.. the procedures surrounding such securities are more demanding than those for
the earlier two categories.'^' Categor\' three securities must not only satisfy the two
general conditions but they are also subjected to a series of rigorous transactional and
offering restrictions that have been changed since the original Regulation S.''"
The transactional restrictions make a distinction between debt and equity
securities.'^ The restrictions for debt securities remain the same as they were under the
original Regulation S,''^"^ and they continue to have a 40 day distribution compliance
period.'" Debt securities also have to satisfy this 40 day restriction.'^^
The transactional restrictions as applied to category three securities are more
stringent under the amended Regulation S. Equity securities falling under category three
must still satisfy a one year distribution compliance period.'" During this time,
purchasers who are not distributors must certify that they are not U.S. residents or
citizens and that they are not obtaining the securities for the benefit of a U.S. person. "
They must also agree that if the securities in question are to be resold, then any such
resale must fall within the requirements of Regulation S, be registered or fall within
'•'^'' Amended Regulation S, supra note 127, at s 230.903(b)(3)
"' Amending Release, supra note 28, at 9635
'" Amended Regulation S, supra note 127, at s 230.902(g), 230.903(b)(3)
'" Id at s 230.903(b)(3)(ii)-(iii)
''''
Id. at s 230.903(b)(3)(ii). See also Adopting Release, supra note 9, at s 230.903(c)(3)
'" Amended Regulation S, supra note 127, at s 230.903(b)(3)(ii)(A)
'*'• Id at s 230.903(b)(3)(ii)(A) and s 230.903(b)(3)(ii)(B)
'" Id at s 230.903(b)(3)(iii)(A)
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another exemption to the Securities Act requirements.'^^ Purchasers also have to agree
to not partake in any transactions involving hedging of the Regulation S securities, unless
such hedging is "in compliance with the Act".'^
Category three transactional requirements also require that there be an inscription
on the securities of domestic issuers providing that transfers of such securities are
prohibited, unless the transfer is in accordance with Regulation S.'^' The inscription must
also state that hedging with such securities must not take place "unless in compliance
with the Act".'^^ The issuer too is legally bound '^^ to refuse to register any transfer that
does not comply with Regulation S.'^'* Finally, distributors selling securities under
category three must still provide notice to purchasers that the purchaser is subject to the
same restrictions as the seller was.'^^
The amendments to category three essentially strengthened the transactional
requirements by requiring a statement to the effect of prohibiting hedging activities
during the distribution compliance period unless they are in line with the Act itself. '^^
Such a position is consistent with the Commission's earlier statements in both the
Problematic Practices Release
'^'^
and in the GFL Ultra case.'^^
'*
Id. at s 230.903(b)(3)(iii)(B)(l)
''"
Id. at s 230.903(b)(3)(iii)(B)(2)
'"'Id
'" Id at s 230.903(b)(3)(iii)(B)(3)
•" Id
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Either by contract, provision in its bylaws or some other comparable document.
Amended Regulation S, supra note 127, at s 230.903(b)(3)(iii)(B)(4)
'" Id at s 230.903(b)(3)(iv)
"' Id at s 230.903(b)(3)(iii)(B)(2)-(3)
"^ Problematic Practices Release, supra note 70
"*''
In the Matter of GFL Ultra Fund Ltd., Administrative Proceeding Release No. 3-9333, 64 SEC Docket
1958 (June 18, 1997)
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The amendments to Regulation S also made changes to the offering restrictions
relating to category three domestic equity securities. Distributors have to agree in writing
that all offers and sales made before the end of the distribution compliance period must
comply with the Regulation. '^^ Distributors are now also required to provide in writing
that they will not undertake hedging transactions with equity securities of domestic
issuers unless it is in compliance with the Act.'^° As with the original version, all
documents and materials relating to the offer and sale of any category three securities are
required to contain statements to the effect that the securities have not been registered and
that they may not be offered or sold within the U.S. or to U.S. persons. Offering
materials of equity securities of domestic issuers must also state that hedging is
prohibited with respect to those securities, unless in accordance with the Act.
C. Changes to the Resale Safe Harbor and New Rule 905
While there were few changes to the resale safe harbor, Rule 905 was introduced so as
to classify domestic equity securities as restricted securities within Rule 144.
i. Changes to the Resale Safe Harbor
Rule 904 under the Amended Regulation S still provides a safe harbor for the offshore
resale of unregistered securities by any person apart from the issuer, distributor or their
'*'' Amended Regulation S, supra note 127, at s 230.903(g)(l)(i)
™ Id. ats230.902(g)(l)(ii)
'"
Id. at s 230.902(g)(2)
"^ Id at s 230.905
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agents and affiliates. '^^ The general conditions (namely of an offshore transaction and
no directed selling efforts in the US) still remain. However there have been new
conditions which at times apply to dealers and their affiliates.'
'*
a. New Rule 905
Termed "Resale Limitations", the new Rule 905 gives domestic equity securities a
restricted classification, and also it forbids using the resale safe harbor as a way of
"washing off restrictions from these securities. Rule 905 also tries to prevent the
misuse of promissory notes with respect to Regulation S securities through Rule 144.'^''
1.1 Domestic Equity Securities are now Classified Securities Within the Meaning of
Rule 144'^^
Under the amendments to Regulation S, Rule 905 was introduced and Rule 144 was
modified so as to categorize domestic equity securities from both reporting and non
reporting entities as restricted securities.
'^^
Rule 905 states that such domestic equity
securities acquired in an offer or a sale that is subjected to Regulation S requirements
will be considered restricted securities, and thus will fall within Rule 144. Therefore,
the equity securities of domestic issuers will be subject to all the requirements of Rule
'"
Id. at s 230.904(a)
^^*
Id. ats230.904(a)(lH3)
''^
Id at s 230.905
'^'' 17 C.F.Rs 230.144 (1997)
'^' Amending Release, supra note 28, at 9636, and Amended Regulation S, supra note 127, at s 230.905
'^* Amended Regulation S, supra note 127, at s 230.905
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144, including the one year holding period before such securities are able to be
"onsold".'^^
1 .2 Resales of Domestic Equity Securities not Eliminating the Restricted Securities
Classifications
Rule 905 stops investors from washing off restrictions by the means of the resale safe
harbor by providing that restricted securities defined under Rule 144 "will continue to
be deemed to be restricted securities notwithstanding that they were acquired in a resale
transaction" by means of the resale safe harbor.
1 .3 The Effect of Rule 905 on Promissory Notes
As a result of classifying domestic equity securities as being restricted securities under
Rule 144. the use of promissory notes has been forbidden for purchasing Regulation S
securities in cases where repayment for promissory notes came about by the resale of
the Regulation S securities into the U.S. With Rule 144 now being applicable to
domestic equity securities, the one year restricted period is tolled until particular
conditions are met.
In particular the one year restricted period under Rule 144 for purchasers will not
begin unless the promissory note "provides full recourse against the purchaser of the
securities;" and "is secured by collateral, other than the securities purchased, having a
'" 17 C.F.R. s 230. 144(d)(l)( 1997)
'*" Amended Regulation S, supra note 127, at s 230.905
'*'
"Tolling'' means that the holding period will not begin to run until the conditions are satisfied.
s
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fair market value at least equal to the purchase price of the securities purchased."
Another new addition to Regulation S is that even after the restricted period has been
completed, before any resale of the security can take place, full payment for the
promissory note must have occurred. '^"^ As a result of this, offshore buyers cannot buy
securities under Regulation S by promissory notes and then fund the payment of the
notes from the proceeds of reselling the Regulation S securities into the U.S.
Other Changes to the Amendments
Other amendments to Regulation S saw the introduction of a quarterly reporting period
for domestic issuers and made modifications regarding convertible securities.
A. Reporting ofRegulation S Transactions
Because the distribution compliance period, or restricted period, was extended from 40
days to a year for domestic issuers, this meant that there was not much of a need for the
sale of such securities to be reported within 15 days of any offering taking place. Thus it
followed that the amendments to Regulation S removed the 1 5 day reporting
requirement and instead made reporting necessary every quarter. '^^
'"^ 17 C.F.Rs 230.144(d)(2) (1997)
'^^' Id ats230.144(d)(2)(i)(ii)
'*•* Id at s 230.144(d)(2)(iii). See also Amending Release, supra note 28, at 9637
'*^ Amending Release, supra note 28, at 9638
'"* Id at 9634.
'"''
In line with Form 8-K under the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. ss 78a- 78gg (1994)
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B. Convertible Securities
Regulation S convertible debentures came about because they could be converted to
common stock quickly and could be sold in the U.S. market almost immediately. This
eliminated some of the risk of holding Regulation S common shares, which up until the
amendment, were required to be held for a minimum of 40 days. Investors purchased
convertible bonds in anticipation of receiving interest payments while waiting for the
stock price to appreciate. When the stock price had increased above a specific price, the
investors would then convert their bonds.
Regulation S convertible debentures had a conversion price that was usually set
by taking the average price of the securities for the five days leading up to the
conversion date. Often, the issuer would also give an extra discount from the final
conversion price so that the lower the price of the stock being purchased, the better the
situation would be for the convertible debenture investors.
In many cases, share prices had a "mysterious habit of dipping" '^"^ just prior to
the debentures being converted. This not only resulted in suspicions arising about the
use of convertible debentures with respect to Regulation S securities, but it also resulted
in offshore debenture holders gaining significant bargains. Consequently, many
companies refused to honor conversion rights on this form of convertible security.'^" In
dealing with these problems the SEC stated that the new restrictions and classifications
""'
J Scholl Pirates Play, BARRON'S, Jan. 6, 1997
''"Id
'''Id
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regarding domestic equity securities would also be applicable to convertible
• • 191
secunties.
'" Amending Release, supra note 28, at 9634
i
CHAPTER SEVEN
Probable Impacts of Amendments on Regulation S
It has been a little over two and a half years since the amendments to Regulation S came
into effect. Therefore there has been little litigation regarding the new amendments and
negligible evidence of the effects of the amendments. What follows are some
assessments and predictions as to how the new amendments may address some of the
issues raised throughout the thesis.
A. Probable Effect ofthe Amendments on the Cost ofRaising Capital under
Regulation S
Because of the increased compliance measures - such as certification, legending and
record keeping, which all result in a cost of some form - it seems likely that the
amendments would have the effect of increasing the cost of raising capital under
Regulation S for domestic reporting issuers.
Also, extending the holding period for the equity securities of domestic
reporting issuers will probably result in even greater discounts being given on such
securities than before the amendments, with the discounts occurring as a result of those
securities being labeled as restricted. The greater discounts would likely lead to
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domestic reporting issuers selling even larger amounts of securities in order to raise the
same amount of capital.
Therefore, because of these two factors, issuers may instead end up registering
securities under the onerous Section 5 or seek other exemptions as opposed to satisfying
the more strenuous requirements of the amended Regulation S.
However, it seems there should be little change financially for domestic
nonreporting issuers and foreign issuers after the amendments to Regulation S. and
these classes of issuer will probably continue to use Regulation S.
Probable Impacts of Amendments on Regulator} Abuses
While the abuses concerning the use of promissory notes and the use of the resale safe
harbor to "wash" off restrictions have been dealt with explicitly by the amendments to
Regulation S' ". other abuses have not been treated in the same manner.
For example, while hedging seems to be prohibited by changes to both the
offering and transactional requirements of domestic issuers, there does not appear to be
any definition within either the original regulation or the new amendments which
defines the prohibition on hedging.
Further, the abuses concerning illegal resales within the restricted period (i.e.
distribution compliance period) and the use of phoney offshore shell entities, while
always illegal under the original regulation, have not been explicitly addressed.
See supra text accompanying note 1 66
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Consequently such abuses can conceivably continue under the amendments. The only
difference is that they may be more difficult to carr>' out.
A. Illegal Resales Within the Distribution Compliance Period
In the future, a problem may arise concerning the resale of Regulation S securities by
offshore purchasers during the distribution compliance period. With it likely that issuers
may offer greater discounts (given that there will be more restrictions on the securities
in question), then there will be even greater motivation for purchasers to '"onsell" the
securities that they have purchased as soon as possible because they would gain from
selling their discounted securities at the market price, without waiting out the
distribution compliance period. Yet the increased safeguards in the amended regulation,
especially with regard to domestic reporting issuers, make resale more difficult for the
purchasers to carry out while still in the distribution compliance period. At the same
time, the increased discounts could be viewed by offshore investors as providing some
form of buffer so that purchasers will be less likely to suffer losses when they sell their
securities, as the market would have to virtually collapse before the investors would
suffer a loss.
Domestic reporting issuers also are required to register any transfer of securities
that is not made in accordance with Regulation S.' ' This means that such issuers have
to be aware of the possibility that illegal resales may occur or that there may be attempts
to wash off the restrictions in the resale transfer of the securities. It seems therefore that
'" Amended Regulation S, supra note 127, at s 230.903(b)(3)(iii)(B)(4).
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this new role imposed on issuers will make it more difficult for such illegal resales to
take place. '^"^ The SEC commented that this meant issuers now had "a monitoring role
similar to that which is often imposed in connection with unregistered private
placements''.'^^ Hopefully this monitoring role of issuers will prevent offshore investors
from selling before the end of the distribution compliance period.
B. Creation and Use ofFake Offshore Shell Entities
With the distribution compliance period being extended to one year it is likely that this
extended period would reduce some of the motivation for such sham entities being
established with the sole intention of avoiding the provisions of Regulation S.
Category three requires that purchasers of such securities must certify that they
are not U.S. persons and that they are not acquiring the securities for the account or the
benefit of a U.S. person. '^^ The SEC believed that making such a requirement apply to
equity securities of domestic reporting issuers would help to put an end to some of the
abuses regarding phoney offshore shell entities. However, whether this requirement
will serve as any deterrent measure to such practices remains unclear. Presumably those
involved in the creation of such entities probably already knew the practice was against
Regulation S. Consequently any additional notice requirements will probably not deter
the users of such practices.
"^ Amending Release, supra note 28, at 9636.
'''Id
"^ Amending Release, supra note 28, at 9636 and Amended Regulation S, supra note 127. at s
230.903(b)(3)(iii)(B)(l). See also Original Regulation S, supra note 1, at s230.903(c)(3)(iii)(B)(l)
"' Amending Release, supra note 28, at 9636.
"* Amended Regulation S, supra note 127, at s 230.902(k)(l)(viii).
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Nonetheless, extending the distribution compliance period to one year would
seem to act as a disincentive to those using the sham entities as a way of circumventing
Regulation S. This is because of the greater risk associated with holding securities for a
longer time frame. ' Also, in many cases, where offshore shells are used the share price
is manipulated before dumping the shares back into the U.S. It would seem difficult to
manipulate the share price for an entire year before reselling the shares back into the
U.S. without being detected either by the SEC or the market itself
C. Use ofPromissory Notes
Under the amendments to Regulation S. the one year holding period for promissory
notes relating to domestic securities is tolled, this means the notes have to be
completely paid off before they are able to be resold in the U.S. Consequently schemes
whereby the purchaser of a promissory note did not have to pay anv'thing for the
Regulation S securities before onselling them have been prohibited.'^*^^
D. Use ofthe Resale Safe Harbor to "Wash Off Restrictionsfrom Otherwise
Restricted Securities
By introducing Rule 905, the SEC has made it clear that the resale safe harbor can no
longer be used as a means of washing off the restriction relating to equity securities of
domestic issuers.
For example the market could fall, or the SEC could discover the phoney set up.
^""nC.F.R s230. 144(d)(2) (1996)
^"' Amended Regulation S, supra note 127. at s 230.905
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E. Hedging
While the SEC put anti-hedging provisions in the Category three transactional and
offering restrictions, it did not state what transactions were prohibited under Regulation
S and what transactions were "in compliance with the Act"." The SEC even stated
in its release which accompanied the amendments that they did "not impose any new
restrictions on hedging practices". Thus, from this i't would appear that the GFL
Ultra Fimcf"^ and SEC v. Ah Parnes'^^ cases contain the Commission's view on
hedging^^^. In GFL Ultra it was found that the fund in question had purchased
Regulation S shares with the intention of distributing them, therefore making the fund a
statutory underwriter which needed to register its shares before it resold them.'
Yet with the new provisions in Category three in which purchasers of such
securities agree not to become involved in hedging activities "unless in compliance
with the Act"'^^^, it is not clear whether purchasers not considered statutory underwriters
would still be in breach of the regulation via the purchasing agreement.
Also unclear, because of extension of the restricted period from 40 days previously
to one year under the amendments, is whether or not holding such securities (of
^"^
Id. at ss 230.902(g)(l)(ii), 230.902(g)(2), 230.903(b)(3)(iii)(B)(2)-(3).
'''Id.
''* Amending Release, supra note 28, at 9635.
^"^
In the Matter of GFL Ultra Fund, Administrative Proceedings Release, No. 3-9333, 64 SEC Docket
1958 (June 18, 1997)
^'"' SEC V. Ari Fames et al, SEC Litigation Release No. 16877 (Jan. 31. 2001)
'^ See supra Part IV.A.iv.
^"* Administrative Proceeding Release, No. 3-9333, 64 SEC Docket 1958 at 1961 (June 18. 1997)
^"' Amended Regulation S, supra note 127, at s 230.903(b)(3)(iii)(B)(2).
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domestic reporting issuers) could still be regarded as purchasing the securities for the
purposes of distribution.
Probable Impact of Amendments on Marketplace Concerns
As outlined earlier, the markets raised concerns about the operation of Regulation S^".
These concerns included discounting, a lack of disclosure and the dilutive effects of the
Regulation S shares flowing back into the U.S market. These concerns are discussed
below in light of the amendments.
A. Greater Discounts Will Be Offered By Domestic Issuers
It seems likely that because the holding period is extended for equity securities of
reporting issuers to one year, such issuers will probably give even greater discounts than
in the past. This is because of the greater risks that purchasers have to face, as well as
the decreased transferability that such securities now face given the increased
transactional restrictions. Furthermore, because domestic reporting and nonreporting
issuers are subjected to the same restrictions, it seems likely that domestic nonreporting
issuers will have to offer an even greater discount to prospective purchasers in order to
attract them because nonreporting issuer securities are less tradable in the market than
the securities of reporting issuers.
^'° This is the definition of an underwriter in 15 U.C.S s 77b(l 1). See In the Matter ofGFL Ultra Fund,
Administative Proceeding Release, No. 3-9333, 64 SEC Docket 1958 at 1960 (June 18, 1997).
^" See discussion infra Part IV.
B
^'^ Amended Regulation S, 5Mpranote 127, at ss 230.903(b)(3)(iii)-(iv), 230.905. See also Rule 144 - s
230.144(a)(3)(v).
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B. Dilution May Become a Problem Depending on the Discounts Offered
With greater discounts likely to be offered by offerors of domestic equity securities,
purchasers may choose to wait out the period, given that the substantial discount would
provide incentive to hold on to the securities for the entire length of the period. Then
upon completion of the one year restricted period the offshore purchasers would
probably create a huge wave of securities flowing back into the U.S market. As a
result of this increase in the supply of securities on the market the price of the shares in
question would probably reduce, thus creating an even greater dilution problem than in
the past. In short, the dilutive effects will depend entirely on the attractiveness of the
7 1 J,
discount offered. Given the discussion below it would appear that issuers may not be
able to discount as much as they may want to, without facing some repercussions from
domestic issuers.
C. Disclosure May Become a Problem
Under the amendments, the SEC changed the reporting requirement from a fifteen day
period to quarterly reporting..^ '^ This change should result in sufficient disclosure for
current shareholders about an issuer's Regulation S offering before the dilutive effects
of the offering are felt. It will also provide shareholders with a chance to query when
these discounts are perceived as being too large, therefore preventing sales of shares
under Regulation S at whatever price the issuer sees fit.
^'^ Proposed Amendments Release, supra note 1 18, at 9265
^'^ See supra Chapter 7.III.C.
^'"'' Amending Release, supra note 28, at 9637.
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However, should it become apparent to the market that a Regulation S offering
has taken place, and if the market learns of this happening before the shareholders do,
then short selling of the issuer's stock may occur. This would result in a drop in the
issuer's share price occurring without the prior knowledge of the shareholders who
could therefore not escape this reduction in share price.
CHAPTER EIGHT
Recommendations Should Abuses and Marketplace Concerns Regarding the
Regulation Continue After the Amendments
As outlined above, there may still remain some opportunity for the abuse of Regulation
S to take place in spite of the amendments. Discussed below are some suggestions
which may help eliminate some of the abuses and concerns, should they continue after
the amendment."
A. Clarify the Law Regarding the Abuses and the Marketplace Concerns
i. The Needfor Clarity
Previously, the SEC determined whether or not a certain transaction was a violation of
Regulation S by interpreting Preliminary Note 2 . The SEC detailed what it perceived
as violations of Regulation S in the Problematic Practices Release.^' However in some
cases the transactions in question took place before the SEC had made its
^'* See Jon B. Jordan, Regulation S and Offshore Capital: Will the New Amendments Rid the Safe Harbor
ofPirates. 19 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 58 (1998)
^'^ Adopting Release, supra note 9, at Preliminary Note 2 where it is stated that "in the view of the
objective of these rules and the policies underlying the Act, Regulation S is not available with respect to
any transaction or series of transactions that, although in technical compliance with these rules, is part of a
plan or scheme to evade the registration provisions of the Act'".
'* Problematic Practices Release, supra note 77, at 35,663 - 35,664
^'^ For example In the Matter of GFL Ultra Fund, Administrative Proceeding Release, No. 3-9333, 64 SEC
Docket 1958 (June 18, 1997).
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interpretations that hedging and some uses of promissory notes were not permitted.'^^°
In the amendments, however, the SEC failed to clarify its position with regard to its
retroactive powers. This lack of clarity has meant that some Regulation S transactions
have been structured in a relatively cautious manner. For example, many issuers'
category two securities have also complied with the category three requirements.
"Domestic issuers that sell equity securities under Regulation S already comply with the
certification and legending requirements of Category 3 as a matter of common
practice" "' in order to ensure that they meet the requirements of whatever the SEC
charged them with, and to make them 'safe" from any retroactive application of the
regulation.
This uncertainty does not help the operation of the Regulation. The SEC would
be well advised to clarify the Regulation in terms of what exactly it considers to be a
violation and to what extent, if any, it has retroactive powers, in order to create a greater
degree of certainty in the operation of the Regulation.
^^" See supra text accompanying note 100
^^' Amending Release, supra note 28, at 9639
62
ii. Ways ofClarifying the Regulation
In order to clarify the regulation, the SEC could either state directly what it perceives as
being abuses in the regulation or alternatively, it could rewrite the regulation relating it
to the abuses of Regulation S that occur.'^'^^
1.1. Incorporate Rule 144 Promissory Note Provisions Directly Into Regulation S
The current approach regarding Promissory Notes is to read Rule 144 in conjunction
with Regulation S. Although these two rules overlap, they do not in any way directly
address the promissory notes issue. What is needed is for the provisions contained in
Rule 144 to be explicitly written in Regulation S. This could then make the Rule 144
provisions apply to the issuer safe harbors and relate the distribution compliance period
to the holding period for the Rule 144 provisions. A measure like this would clarify the
position and remove the necessity to read a separate regulation.
B. Recommendations Concerning Promissory' Notes ifa More Clarified Regulation
does not Work
Should the SEC choose not to clarify its position with respect to promissory notes, or if
such a clarified regulation did not work, then the SEC could consider the following.
"^ Although an overstatement of what is considered an abuse could result in enabling the creation of
further loopholes, care must always be taken to prevent this from occurring.
"^ Amended Regulation S, supra note 127, at s 230.905 and see Rule 144 at s 230.144(d)(2).
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/. Toll the One Year Holding Period Until Promissory Notes are Fully Paid
At present, the restricted period does not begin until the promissory note states that full
recourse will be provided against the purchaser of the securities. Such recourse is to be
secured by collateral that has a fair market value, and that is equal in value to the
purchase price of the Regulation S securities." Following the expiration of the
restricted period the promissory note is required to be fully paid for before the securities
can be resold under Regulation S.""^ Under the amendment this means that.
conceivably, a purchaser could borrow in order to pay the note off in its entirety and
then immediately resell the security, after which the loan could be repaid. This would
mean that the purchaser would be paying for the promissory note with the funds
acquired from the sale of the Regulation S securities - a transaction type which the
amendment had tried to forclose. Therefore, one way to stop this practice from
occurring (essentially similar to that which happened before the amendment) would be
to toll the distribution compliance period until the note has been paid for entirely.
"' See Rule 144, 15 U.S.C s 230. 144(d)(2)(i)(ii) (1994)
^^^
Id., and Amending Release, supra note 28, at 9637
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a. Prohibit the Use ofPromissory Notes Altogether as Paymentfor Regulation S
Securities
Should the problem with promissory notes continue, another more extreme measure
would be to prohibit altogether the use of promissory notes as a means of payment for
domestic equity securities. The SEC did in fact propose such an alternative with its
initial amendments, ^ although it did not mature into an actual amendment because of
commentators" concerns.
C Place More Clarifying Language in the Regulation Stating that the Resale Safe
Harbor Cannot be Used to "Wash Off" Restrictions
Reading Rule 905 and Rule 144 together, the resale safe harbor appears not to be
available to "wash off restrictions.^^'' It may be more appropriate, however, if the SEC
were to amend Regulation S to clarify its position that the resale safe harbor is not to be
used as a way of "washing off" restrictions as opposed to having to read the two rules
together. Such a statement could be similar to that it issued in the Problematic Practices
Release.^^^
"' Proposed Amendments Release, supra note 1 1 8, at 9262 - 9263
"' Amended Regulation S, sidpra note 127, at s 230.905 which concerns resale limitations. It states that;
"Equity securities of domestic issuers acquired from the issuer, a distributor, or any of their respective
affiliates in a transaction subject to the conditions of s 230.901 or s 230.903 are deemed to be "restricted
securities" as defined in s 230.144. Resales of any such restricted securities by the offshore purchaser must
be made in accordance with this Regulation S."
^^* See supra note 77
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D. Hedging Activities Prohibited Under the Regulation Need to be Clarified in the
Regulation
Hedging continues to cause confusion because of the uncertain stance taken by the SEC.
For example, in the GFL Ultra case the SEC stated that hedging was prohibited by
Regulation S and anti- hedging measures were included in the amendments.
Furthermore, section 230.902(g)(l)(ii) of the amendments states that ''Each
distributor agrees in writing ... for offers and sales of equity securities of domestic
issuers, not to engage in hedging transactions with regard to such securities (emphasis
added)", and likewise it is stated in s 230.902(g)(2) ^' that ''[F]or offers and sales of
equity securities of domestic issuers, such offering materials and documents also must
state that hedging transactions involving those securities may not be conducted unless
in compliance with the Act (emphasis added)"". A similar prohibition against hedging
also appears in s 230.903(b)(3)(iii)(B)(2-3) of the amendments.
However the release accompanying the amendments stated that the changes did not
place any new restrictions on hedging,'^^^ which seems to be at odds with the actual text
of the amendment as outlined above. Therefore the SEC's position with regard to
hedging is ambiguous and needs to be clarified.
"' In the Matter of GFL Ultra Fund, Administrative Proceeding Release No. 3-9333, 64 SEC Docket 1958
at 1961 (June 18, 1997)
"" Amended Regulation S, supra note 127
"' Id
"^ Amending Release, supra note 28, at n. 28
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Recommendations if the Amended Regulation Becomes too Restrictive for
Domestic Issuers in the Absence of Abuses
Given the tightening of the regulations pertaining to domestic issuers it is conceivable
that Regulation S may no longer be used as a means of raising foreign capital by these
issuers. The stricter regulations will make their offerings less attractive so that they may
have to offer discounts, and their compliance costs will increase with the new notice
requirements. The SEC itself noted that:
The amendments will impose restrictions on purchasers of equity securities of
U.S issuers, as well as on the issuers themselves, that may make it more costly
for such issuers to raise funds through Regulation S placements . . . however, the
Commission believes that these restrictions are needed to prevent abusive
practices that have occurred under Regulation S.
Given that a significant amount of disclosure is already required from domestic
reporting issuers, by virtue of their own nature (as opposed to domestic nonreporting
issuers), then it is debatable whether the two classes of issuers should be required to
fulfil the same restrictions and regulations.
If the amended regulation becomes too restrictive, then the SEC could consider
a number of different measures with respect to domestic reporting issuers, who are
already subject to other disclosure mechanisms. For example, it could reduce the
distribution compliance period to six months, and remove the restricted securities
classification on such securities. The SEC could also consider putting such securities
back into Category Two (as they were originally) or. alternatively, making the
"^ Id at Part V. Cost Benefit Analysis
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transactional requirements similar to what they were in Category Two, as opposed to
the more onerous requirements of Category Three.
CHAPTER NINE
The Challenges Posed by Globalization
As alluded to at the beginning of this thesis, ^ the globahzation of securities markets
poses many challenges to regulators. These challenges include "the increasing
integration of the world's financial markets and the presence of systemic risk, referring
to a simultaneous collapse of the securities markets worldwide". " The debate over the
regulation of global securities markets grows in importance as the internationalization
of capital markets continues at a dramatic pace. There are varied approaches that
regulators have adopted in response to this rapidly evolving international marketplace,
several of which will be discussed below.
A. Extraterritorality ofthe United States Securities Regime
The United States often applies its own domestic securities laws to transactions in other
countries, justifying its actions as necessary to protect American investors and the
integrity of U.S. capital markets. However, many commentators disagree with this
extraterritorial approach stating that:
It is still in the best interests of the United States and of the global economy as a
whole for disclosure regulation to be undertaken at the national level and for the
234
235
See supra Part II.B
Marc I. Steinberg & Lee E. Michaels, Disclosure in Global Securities Offerings: Analysis of
Jurisdictional Approaches, Commonality and Reciprocity, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 207, 209 (1999)
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United States to apply its regime only to those issuers that have their economic
center of gravity in the United States."
/. Section 5 and Regulation S
Regulation S was adopted by the SEC in order "to clarify the extraterritorial
application"'^"'^ of the section 5 registration provisions in the face of increasing
globalization. It establishes a limitation to the possible world-wide jurisdictional reach
of section 5" . Rules 901 through 904. which form the body of Regulation S. take a
primarily territorial approach to jurisdiction. Regulation S gives "recognition to the
doctrine of comity and the territorial approach to the application of section 5""^ . While
some commentators believe Regulation S to be ineffective in dealing with
globalization^'^°, others believe that by limiting the application of U.S. laws and
providing clear means for both investors and issuers to opt-out of the domestic
regulatory system, it increases regulatory competition^^' which, in turn, fiirthers the
general goals of securities laws.'^'*'^
"' CHOI & GUZMAN, supra note 6. at 903.
"^ Adopting Release, supra note 9, at 1 8306
"\See supra Pan U.C.
"' Adopting Release, supra note 9. at 1 8306
^*°
"Most of the efforts made through regulation S and the extraterritorial application of the Securities Act
to deal with the increasing internationalization of the securities markets have been misguided" CHOI &
GUZMAN.,vM/7ra note 6, at 914
Jane C. Kang, The Regulation ofGlobal Futures Markets: Is Harmonization Possible or Even
Desirable^. 17 J. INT'L. L. BUS. 242 (1996)
^'^ See supra text accompanying notes 267-68
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//. Justifications ofExtraterritoriality
"Congress intended the Exchange Act to have extraterritorial application in order to
protect domestic investors who have purchased foreign securities on American
exchanges and to protect the domestic securities market from the effects of improper
foreign transactions in American securities" . as confidence in a nation's capital
market may decline if fraudulent companies are allowed to issue securities in the market
or traders are allowed to engage in manipulative practices. However the differing
approaches detailed below are also argued to further the goals of securities regulation of
investor and market protection.
Approaches to the International Regulation of Securities
Generally, most modem securities markets are regulated on a national basis. This
practice creates a challenge in light of the increased internationalization of the securities
markets and the increasing interdependence among them. Alternatives to extraterritorial
application of national securities regimes as a means of regulating the international
securities market are detailed below.
There are two key viewpoints which have developed in dealing with the
challenges posed in regulating a global marketplace. Supporters of harmonization of
securities regulation argue that standardization of regulatory requirements among
countries would enhance protection for investors and level the playing field in the
competition for market share. They argue that "regulatory disharmony remains a
"^ Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 206 (4"^ Cir. 1968) (Judge Lumbard)
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significant obstacle to the effectuation of an integrated international market". '^'*^ The
opposing view is in favor of regulatory competition, which would provide choice to
issuers and investors in how they should be regulated. Advocates of regulator}'
competition assert that harmonization could lead to excessive regulation without
sufficient corresponding regulatory benefit. This belief is based on the many
distinguishing characteristics of each nation's market maturity, history, culture and legal
system, which would make it very difficult to find a single solution which is viable for
every country.
Various regulatory approaches have been taken in response to globalization,
each intended to meet either the goal of harmonization or regulatory competition in a
global marketplace.
A. Cooperation^''^
In an increasingly global economy with complex offerings taking place in several
jurisdictions, it may not be feasible for regulators in each country to attempt to enforce
the perceived regulatory goals of that jurisdiction. In order to harmonize different
regulatory approaches some nations are beginning to cooperate internationally both on a
bilateral and multilateral basis in order to carry out their regulatory and enforcement
objectives.
The aim of cooperation is the development of a common set of regulations to be
used by all participants in international offerings. ^ In order to encourage and
"' STEINBERG & MICHAELS, supra note 235, at 208
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implement cooperation in the international market, in 1 974 several western nations^"*^
organized what is today known as IOSCO . lOSCO's pnmary objective today is to
develop, on a global basis, high standards of financial market regulation, minimize
systemic risk and facilitate cross border transactions^"*^.
Other commentators believe a better approach to the international regulation of
securities would be one which encourages regulatory competition among different
regimes and provides choice to issuers and investors in how they should be regulated.
two of which are discussed below.
B. Normal Reciprocity
Under a normal reciprocity securities regime'^"^°. a country allows a foreign issuer to sell
securities within its domestic jurisdiction while complying only with the regulations of
the issuer's own jurisdiction. Normal reciprocity fosters capital mobility by increasing
the regulatory choices to investors who are unable to sift capital abroad - so in this way
it increases regulatory competition.
^'*' Sometimes referred to as commonality.
^^^ The benefits of cooperation are argued to include "the use of uniform information in making global
investment decisions, the lowering of transaction costs, the facilitation of cross-border offerings, and the
ability to establish an international database". Manning G. Warren, Global Harmonization ofSecurities
Laws: The Achievements ofthe European Communities. 31 HARV. INT'L. L.J. 185, 191 (1990)
^'^ The charter members of IOSCO are Quebec and Ontario.
^'*^ IOSCO was initially called the Inter American Association of Securities Commissions
"'' STEINBERG & mIcHAELS, supra note 235, at n.2 13
As at July 1996, there were 465 agreements in place in 52 jurisdictions, IOSCO Index of Memorandum of
Understanding and Similar Agreements Between IOSCO Members (July 1996)
^'" Normal reciprocity can be found outside of the securities context. For example, many countries will
honor the drivers licenses of other countries. Either the actual drivers license is accepted or individuals can
obtain a visitor license by showing their foreign license without having to comply with local testing
requirements.
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Normal reciprocity is advantageous for issuers because it decreases the cost of
selling securities abroad as parties are freed from having to learn and comply with a
new set of laws when they enter a new jurisdiction. Rather, parties may continue to
follow their own domestic laws regardless of the jurisdiction in which the transactions
take place. Alternatively, if the issuer prefers the foreign jurisdiction's regime, the
issuer may choose to comply with its securities regulation instead.
The United States has a reciprocity agreement with Canada called the
Multijurisdictional Disclosure System (MJDS,) which was established in 1991. Under
this agreement Canadian issuers may issue securities in the U.S. while complying only
with Canadian registration and disclosure requirements so long as their financial
statements conform to U.S. generally accepted accounting principles. So Canadian
issuers need not avoid American capital markets simply because they dislike the U.S.
securities regulatory regime.
Normal reciprocity only allows an issuer to carry a domestic regime abroad as
the issuer seeks capital in other countries. It does not allow a domestic firm to "import"
another country's laws. Consequently, some commentators"" ' believe that normal
reciprocity does not maximize the potential for regulatory competition, and they support
the portable reciprocity approach instead.
"' CHOI & GUZMAN, supra note 6, at 921
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C. Portable Reciprocity
Under a portable reciprocity approach, participating countries would allow issuers to
select the securities regime under which their securities transactions would be governed.
Once selected, one set of securities laws would govern all aspects of the issuance and
trading of the company's securities, regardless of the physical location of the
transactions.
^'
Portable reciprocity rejects territorial notions ofjurisdiction and allows
securities market participants to choose the most appropriate regulatory regime for
themselves. In this way, portable reciprocity essentially allows issuers to determine the
jurisdictional reach of different countries" securities regimes.
"Portable reciprocity extends the concept of reciprocity to include multiple
countries, diverse regulations, and greater issuer choice". " Any combination of issuer
nationality, investor nationality, regime choice, and transaction location are permissible
under a portable reciprocity regime. Therefore the choice of capital markets and the
choice of governing law are completely separate.
Because issuers will choose the most efficient securities regime to govern their
transaction, countries will have an incentive to provide such regimes in order to expand
or maintain their capital markets, therefore regulatory competition will increase. Also,
"to the extent that extra regulatory protections are costly to issuers and not valued by
"^ For example, consider a U.S. based multinational firm named X. Co. Under a portable reciprocity
regime X. Co. could choose to apply the laws of any participating country to a securities offering in the
United States. The choice of regime is entirely up to X. Co. Furthermore, X. Co.'s transactions could take
place within any of the participating countries.
"^ CHOI & GUZMAN, supra note 6, at 921
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sophisticated investors, global market efficiency is increased by allowing such issuers
and investors to bypass these regulatory protections through their selection of an
alternate securities regime".
^^"^
This thesis follows other commentators' " m asserting that portable reciprocity
provides the best solution to the challenges of the international securities market. "^^ It is
argued that portable reciprocity best advances the goals of securities laws, as regulatory
competition among countries will benefit and protect both investors and capital markets.
Investors would benefit from a portable reciprocity approach as it increases the
return on investment because it allows issuers to choose the regime with the least
compliance costs. To the extent that issuers are forced to bear high compliance costs,
issuers may either exit the capital markets or raise the price of their securities. Either
action reduces the investor's return on investment.
Another way in which portable reciprocity benefits investors is by increasing
investor protection. It achieves this by introducing an additional factor for investors to
consider when choosing an investment - the regime which the issuer chose to trade
under. For example, investors may choose to restrict their investments to securities
issued under U.S. laws. Because American securities laws are very strict, investors can
assume that only high quality issuers seeking to distinguish themselves from lower
quality issuers will choose to comply with the U.S. regime.
^'^ Dangerous Extraterritoriality, supra note 243, at 220.
"' CHOI & GUZMAN, supra note 6, at 950-5 1
.
There are those who criticize portable reciprocity as creating investor confusion if investors fail to
realize that securities trading in a particular capital market are in fact governed by another jurisdiction's
laws. Opposers of portable reciprocity also claim that the resulting regulatory competition may result in
Cont. Next Page
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Portable reciprocity provides capital market protection in at least two ways.
First, it allows issuers and investors to avoid a country's overly burdensome regulatory
regime while still trading in the capital markets of that country. Secondly, it increases
investor confidence in the capital market to the extent that issuers select regimes which
maximize the joint welfare of issuers and investors. This increases the securities volume
and liquidity of a country's capital markets. ^
For the above-mentioned reasons this thesis endorses portable reciprocity as the
ideal approach for countries to adopt to the international regulation of securities.
countries adopting laws aimed towards opportunistic managers rather than laws designed to maximize
social value in the capital markets. See STEINBERG & MICHAELS, supra note 235, at 267.
^" For example, investors may be adverse to trading in a small country's market due to its weak regulatory
regime. However, under a portable reciprocity scheme an issuer can choose a stricter regime to govern the
issuer's transactions in order to induce investors to trade in the small country's capital markets.
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CHAPTER TEN
Conclusion
It is important not to forget why Regulation S was introduced when it was adopted in
1990. Essentially, the Regulation made it easier for domestic entities to raise capital
offshore by reducing the costs involved and also by making domestic entities more
attractive to offshore investors. The impetus for the introduction of Regulation S was
the increasing globalization taking place, the uncertainty created as a result of the
potentially worldwide reach of section 5 of the Securities Act 1933. and the ensuing
Release No. 4708 " which resulted in "a voluminous series of no-action letters, which
still left some continuing uncertainties". " However, after the introduction of
Regulation S in 1990, many unintentional loopholes became apparent. These loopholes
included illegal resales within the restricted period, the creation and use of fake offshore
shell entities, the use of the proceeds of the Regulation S resales to pay for promissory
notes, the use of the resale safe harbor to "wash off restrictions, and the use of hedging
to "lock in profits". These loopholes were exploited by many investors and entities
alike.
^"'' See supra note 1
7
"' RICHARD W. JENNINGS ET AL, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 577
(8th ed. 1998)
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It was against this backdrop of abuse that marketplace concerns developed
regarding the original Regulation. The marketplace became concerned about the
discounting that was occurring on Regulation S securities because not only was such
discounting only available to foreign investors, it was often not disclosed. This resulted
in large yet unexplained flows of Regulation S securities entering the U.S market.
Initially the SEC acted to put a halt to both the 'abuses and the marketplace
concerns by issuing the Problematic Practices Release^^' in 1995. It was not until 1997,
however, that the SEC issued its proposed amendments to Regulation S^^".
Following a discussion period in which comments were sought regarding the
proposed amendment, the SEC adopted an amended Regulation S in 1998. While
there was no change to the general statement, changes were made to both the issuer and
resale safe harbors. The amendments also saw the addition of a new rule, Rule 905.
The SEC introduced the amendments in an effort to put a stop to the perceived
exploitation and abuse of the original Regulation S. Yet in doing so, it would appear
that these amendments have instead acted to curb some of the very objectives that the
regulation was initially intended to promote.
A likely impact of the amendments is that, due to the additional compliance
measures, the cost of raising capital under Regulation S will increase. Further, many of
the abuses appear to be able to continue - albeit with more difficulty. While
marketplace concerns relating to disclosure seem to have been addressed, concerns over
"° See 5wpra Part IV.B.
*' See supra note 77
"^ Proposed Amendments Release, supra note 1 18.
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discounting have not been adequately dealt with, instead it appears that even greater
discounting and dilution could potentially occur under the amendments.
Given that the amendments generally do not seem to deal with the abuses and
concerns arising from the original Regulation S. it may be appropriate for the SEC to
consider various other measures in addressing Regulation S. Clarifying the powers that
the SEC possesses with respect to the regulation would help, especially as concerns
exist regarding the retroactive powers of the Commission. '^"^ Further, clarification
regarding promissory notes, the use of the resale safe harbor to "wash off" restrictions,
and the use of hedging would be relatively simple measures the SEC could apph' in
order to help the operation of the amendment.
Should it become evident following the amendments that the marketplace
concerns remain, then the SEC could consider improving the disclosure provisions
regarding Regulation S securities. This would presumably make shareholders aware of a
Regulation S offering and provide them with an opportunity to sell before the flow back
of shares into the U.S. market.
Another possibility following the amendments is that the regulation may become
too restrictive for domestic issuers. If this were found to be the case, then perhaps the
SEC should reduce some of the restrictions on this category of issuer.
Therefore, while Regulation S was introduced to provide greater certainty with
respect to offshore offerings, its actual application has developed in a manner nintended
by the SEC. While the SEC acknowledged this in its amendments, it is still not entirely
^" Amending Release, supra note 28.
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evident whether the amendments have in fact been successful in achieving their aims.
Perhaps instead what is required is greater clarity of the SEC"s position, while at the
same time still creating a fair and workable securities regime. The recent globalization
of capital markets will need to be taken into consideration in order to achieve this.
As the internationalization of securities markets continues, the importance of
effective regulation for offshore transactions grows. There are several possible
approaches to the regulation of international securities transactions: cooperation, normal
reciprocity and portable reciprocity. However, because it best furthers the securities
regulation goals of investor and market protection, portable reciprocity is recommended
as the ideal approach for the United States (and other countries) to apply to the
regulation of international capital markets.
"* See supra Part VIII.A./. /. /.
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